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care of anything. It should not be seen as a privilege or as a benefit, but a
fundamental human right.” – Faye Wattleton1
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 1999, a woman named Katie Carton informed her live-in
boyfriend, Dale Heidbreder, that she was pregnant with their first child.2
The couple resided in Fort Madison, Iowa—a town with a population of
slightly more than 10,000.3 Carton and Heidbreder were eighteen and
nineteen years of age, respectively.4 At some point, the couple had a
disagreement, and Carton moved out.5 She did not tell Heidbreder where
she was going and likewise instructed friends and family to keep her
whereabouts a secret.6 She had, in fact, moved to Minnesota, where she
would eventually put the child up for adoption.7 When the child was born,
Carton refused to identify Heidbreder as the father and instead left that
portion of the birth certificate blank.8 Still in Iowa, Heidbreder attempted
repeatedly to locate Carton and even hired an attorney to try and protect his
paternal rights.9 Thirty-one days after Carton gave birth, Heidbreder, for
the first time, learned not only that she was in the state of Minnesota, but
also that she was in the process of giving the child up for adoption.10
Although Heidbreder immediately took legal action to protect his paternal
rights, Minnesota law requires nonmarital fathers to take such action thirty
days following the birth of the child.11 Because he was one day late, his
rights were terminated, and the adoption was allowed to proceed.12
Now, consider the story of S.F., an Alabama man, who in 1992
attended a party at the home of a female friend, T.M.13 He arrived at the
party intoxicated and shortly thereafter passed out in T.M.’s bed.14 The
other party-goers eventually left for the evening, leaving S.F. in the sole

1. Marcia Ann Gillespie, Repro Woman: Faye Wattleton Maps Strategy with Marcia Ann
Gillespie, MS., Oct. 1989, at 50, 50.
2. See Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. 2002).
3. Id.; FORT MADISON COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 10 fig.1.1, available at http://www.fortmadisonia.com/ DocumentCenter/View/191.
4. Heidbreder, 645 N.W.2d at 360.
5. Id. at 361.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 362.
9. Id. at 361.
10. Id. at 362.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 363.
13. See S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
14. Id.

4 HIGDON 507-549 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Marginalized Fathers and Demonized Mothers

1/22/2015 1:03 PM

509

care of T.M.15 When S.F. awoke the next morning, he was surprised to find
that all of his clothing—save his unbuttoned shirt—had been removed
sometime during the night.16 Over the next few months, T.M. would boast
to others about how she had engaged in sexual intercourse with S.F. while
he was unconscious.17 She would even go so far as to describe the evening
as one that had “saved her a trip to the sperm bank.”18 T.M. did in fact give
birth to a child, and genetic testing confirmed that S.F. was the biological
father.19 As a result, he was ordered to pay child support.20 The fact that he
never consented to the sexual act was deemed irrelevant.21
I begin with these two examples (and there are numerous others in both
categories)22 to illustrate the degree to which a mother can dictate what
degree of reproductive freedom a nonmarital father may enjoy. In the first
class of cases, the law permits a mother to evade the father long enough to
sever his parental rights without his consent. In the second, the law allows a
mother to use sexual assault as a means to force fatherhood on a male who
never even consented to the sexual act that created the child. The role the
women’s actions played in the resolution of both classes of cases is, of
course, quite troubling. I must confess, however, that I feel somewhat
uncomfortable even bringing up these examples of male subordination.
After all, I consider myself a feminist and have even written in the past on
the extreme harms that flow from society’s devaluation of all things
feminine.23 As Professor Janet Halley astutely recognized, “[e]xposing the
possibility that women sometimes use a posture of suffering powerfully,
thus harming others, and especially exposing the possibility that they harm
men, is tantamount to a denial that women suffer and thus also a denial that
they are subordinated.”24 And, indeed, I do sincerely believe that, despite
the progress that has been made, women continue to suffer subordination at
the hands of men. For numerous reasons, however, I ultimately conclude
that none of these concerns should mean that male subordination in the area
of reproductive freedom should go ignored by feminists—in fact, just the
opposite.

15. Id. at 1188.
16. Id. at 1187.
17. Id. at 1188.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1186.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1189.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, To Lynch a Child: Bullying and Gender Nonconformity in Our
Nation’s Schools, 86 IND. L.J. 827 (2011).
24. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 317
(2006) (recognizing, but ultimately disagreeing with that line of reasoning).
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To start with, feminists are no strangers to controversy or difficult
questions. Legal feminists, after all, do come in many different varieties,
among which a great deal of disagreement exists.25 At the heart of
feminism, however, lies what has been described as “a subordination
theory set by default to seek the social welfare of women, femininity, and/
or female or feminine gender by undoing some part or all of their
subordination to men, masculinity, and/or male or masculine gender.”26 Or,
more simply, feminism is a “universal theory in that it is a general theory of
the oppression of women by men.”27 When we look, then, at a problem
through the lens of feminist legal theory, we are engaging in “an analysis of
women’s subordination for the purpose of figuring out how to change it.”28
It is for this reason that feminist legal theory is the perfect lens through
which to look at laws like those that are the subject of this Article—laws
that allow one person to dictate the reproductive responsibilities of another.
Indeed, these current deprivations facing men parallel the broader struggles
women have historically faced in attempting to wrest control of their
destinies out of the hands of men. For example, just as common law
coverture gave men complete dominion over their wives’ property,29 the
current law puts women in almost complete control of the parental rights of
a nonmarital male.30 More importantly, however, legal feminist theory is
not merely a useful vehicle for analyzing this area of father’s rights, but
legal feminists themselves should be acutely concerned with the degree to
which the law denies men reproductive freedom.31 After all, as Justice
Ginsburg once wrote, “discrimination by gender generally cuts with two
edges and is seldom, if ever, a pure favor to women.”32 Indeed, as
discussed later in this Article, the laws under discussion here directly
impact several key feminist principles such as sex stereotypes and bodily
autonomy.

25. See Debora Halbert, Feminists Interpretations of Intellectual Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 432 (2006) (noting “there is no single feminism that can claim to speak for all
women who call themselves feminists. Feminist thought aligns loosely around themes regarding
women’s equality, but the multiplicity of feminism(s) at times overshadows the similarities.”).
26. HALLEY, supra note 24, at 4; see also Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and
the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1996) (noting that feminism has primarily
been concerned with ending “the unjust subordination of women”).
27. CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, FEMINISM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF OPPRESSION 22 (1989)
(emphasis omitted).
28. Linda Gordon, The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three Stages of Feminism, in
CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 107, 107 (Zillah R. Eisenstein ed.,
1978).
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Court’s Grapplings with Sex Discrimination, in THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 132, 140 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
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This Article first begins, however, with a closer look at the common
law practice of coverture. Section II does so in an attempt to set the stage
with an example of another area of law—mercifully no longer in effect—
that placed one’s gender’s rights in the hands of the other. Feminists fought
hard to end that practice and, as a result, have gained a rich understanding
of why such an approach does not work and why similar systems should be
resisted. Section III then shifts to a discussion of the law as it relates to the
parental rights of nonmarital fathers, expanding upon the two examples that
began this Article—men who were conscripted into fatherhood by the
actions of the mother and men who were, likewise as a result of the
mother’s actions, thwarted in their attempts to legally father their resulting
children. Next, Section IV analyzes why feminists should be concerned
with this area of the law and its current failure to fully protect reproductive
autonomy. Finally, Section V offers suggested changes to the law that
would help combat these discriminatory laws yet, at the same time, not
erode those protections currently afforded female reproductive autonomy.
II. THE LAW OF COVERTURE
Under common law coverture, a woman’s legal identity was almost
completely subsumed by that of her husband.33 As Blackstone described:
“[T]he husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least
is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose
wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing.”34 Thus, marriage
worked an enormous legal disability on most women given that “[m]arried
women could not sue, be sued, make contracts, own property, or keep their
own earnings.”35 Further, “[i]n entering coverture marriage, a woman
relinquished control of all property and assets that she might have inherited
from her family. Any assets that the couple might have accumulated during
their marriage were considered the husband’s property exclusively,
including the household goods, the wife’s clothing, and even the

33. Peter Goodrich, Gender and Contracts, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL
SUBJECTS OF LAW 17, 24 (Anne Bottomley ed., 1996) (“The legal effect of marriage or coverture was to
place the wife not simply within the power or under the control of the husband but it was also to annex
the woman to the husband such that husband and wife were in law one person.”).
34. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430, reprinted in KATHRYN CULLEN-DUPONT,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN’S HISTORY IN AMERICA app., at 302 (2d ed. 2000).
35. Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of Mutual Benefits
Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464, 1497 (2009).
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children.”36 In essence, then, a married female was herself rendered “civilly
dead,”37 existing almost entirely under the shadow of her husband.
Those who supported coverture did so by arguing that the institution
actually benefitted women.38 Blackstone himself stated, when describing
the incidents of coverture, that “the disabilities which the wife lies under,
are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit. So great a
favourite is the female sex of the laws of England.”39 According to its
advocates, coverture assisted women by, first, confining them to the roles
of wife and mother—roles they were destined to fill.40 Such beliefs were so
widespread that one need only look to decisions of the Supreme Court from
this period to see just how ingrained such notions were. For example, in
Bradley v. State, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of laws
excluding women from the legal profession, Justice Bradley offered the
following:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of
interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family
institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband.41
A second justification for coverture was the belief that women were
simply incapable of looking out for their own best interests. Professor Jill
36. LYNNE E. FORD, WOMEN AND POLITICS: THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY 363 (3d ed. 2010).
37. 1848 DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS, reprinted in JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND
INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN app. 2, at 384 (1991).
38. See, e.g., Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456, 459 (1875) (“The protection of the wife . . . was the
principle on which the common law proceeded.”); EDWARD W. SPENCER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 101 (1911) (“[T]he wife or feme during marriage is under the cover or
protection of her husband (her lord or baron), who, for her good and for that of offspring, is the head of
the family and paramount.”) (emphasis added).
39. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 433, as reprinted in MARY POOVEY, UNEVEN
DEVELOPMENTS: THE IDEOLOGICAL WORK OF GENDER IN MID-VICTORIAN ENGLAND 71 (1988).
40. See Gila Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 43, 54 (2005) (footnote omitted) (“Men’s right to keep women subordinated in the private sphere
while keeping the public sphere of freedom and equality for themselves is justified by Locke on the
basis of the order of God and of the laws of nature and hence is predicated on Adam’s dominion over
Eve and on Eve’s submissive role as wife and mother.”).
41. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
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Elaine Hasday has summarized some of the legal treatises from this time
that illustrate the prevalence of this stereotype that “married women’s
contract rights were still limited to protect women ‘against their own
improvidence.’”42 For instance, one treatise from 1900 stated that
“‘feminine weakness’ was ‘the determining factor’ accounting for
continued restrictions on married women’s rights to contract.”43 Finally,
many supported coverture on the basis that, by vesting power in one
spouse, the law cut down on marital and familial discord: “[I]t is absolutely
necessary for the preservation of peace, that where two or more persons are
destined to pass their lives together, one should be endued with such a preeminence as may prevent or terminate all contestation.”44 Of course, under
the law of coverture, it was the man who would always and forever be
placed in that position.
Whatever the justification, the reality was that “[m]arried women were
at the mercy of their husbands’ good will.”45 After all, whatever pleasures a
married woman might enjoy during her marriage largely depended on how
much benevolence her husband chose (in his absolute discretion) to bestow
upon her. And, as one scholar points out, “[n]o doubt there were many
marriages in which husbands treated their wives decently. And some wives,
like Chaucer’s wife of Bath, surely managed to get the upper hand over
their husbands, in spite of prevailing institutions and norms.”46 On the other
hand, “[i]f a husband unleashed the full fury of coverture on his wife, she
could be reduced to penury and [even] lose her children.”47
Regardless of how kindly a husband wielded the power bestowed upon
him by the law of coverture, the greater problem lies in the fact that the law
would even give the husband such power in the first place. Indeed, far from
advancing the interests of women, coverture was instead a mechanism for
“institutionalizing and reproducing the powerlessness and passivity it

42. See Hasday, supra note 35, at 1499 (emphasis omitted) (citing WILLIAM H. CORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LEGAL AND EQUITABLE RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 207 (Philadelphia, Kay & Bro.
1861)).
43. Hasday, supra note 35, at 1499–1500 (quoting ISIDOR LOEB, THE LEGAL PROPERTY
RELATIONS OF MARRIED PARTIES 34 (1900) “The inexperience of the woman and the probability that
her confidence, which she so freely accords, may be taken advantage of, are the chief considerations at
the basis of such provisions.”).
44. PEREGRINE BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFANCY AND COVERTURE 181–82 (E.H. Bennet ed.,
F.B. Rothman 1980) (1816).
45. SARA M. BUTLER, DIVORCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM ONE TO TWO PERSONS IN LAW
12 (2013).
46. Daniel Klerman, Women Prosecutors in Thirteenth-Century England, 14 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 271, 276 (2002).
47. Margaret Valentine Turano, Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, and the Marital Property Law, 21
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 185 (1988). As an example, Professor Turano details the story of author
Caroline Norton, “whose husband exercised his legal rights to take away her children, her inheritance,
her copyrights, and her real property.” Id.
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supposedly reflected to keep women in the home.”48 Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, analogizing the protection that coverture gave to women as being
the same as protection “[s]uch as the wolf gives the lamb,”49 argued that
“[t]here can be no true dignity or independence where there is
subordination to the absolute will of another, no happiness without
freedom.”50 Fueled by the realization that women could never be equal so
long as they had to look to their husbands to dole out their rights, feminists
led the fight to replace coverture with a system that provided married
women with greater rights and a more equal say in their marriages and their
lives.51
Although the fight for gender equality continues to this very day,
feminists are at least somewhat better equipped now than in the past simply
by virtue of the lessons gained from these past struggles. And, there is one
extremely important lesson that has emerged from the law of coverture as it
existed in this country. Specifically, gender equality can never be achieved
so long as one gender is permitted to serve as gatekeeper to the legal rights
of the other. Unfortunately, as the next Section details, when it comes to
reproductive freedom, that is precisely the position in which the current
state of the law has placed unmarried mothers and fathers: the former,
should she choose to wield it, has almost unbridled power to control both
the rights and obligations the latter possesses vis-à-vis a resulting child.
III. FATHER’S REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM: AN IMBALANCE OF POWER
Under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which requires that a certain level of scrutiny be applied to laws that fail to
treat “similarly situated” people alike,52 discrimination on the basis of race
is subject to strict scrutiny53—the rationale being that rarely would a
noninvidious reason exist for discriminating on such a superficial basis.54

48. Danaya C. Wright, “Well-Behaved Women Don’t Make History”: Rethinking English Family,
Law, and History, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 211, 237 (2004).
49. SUE DAVIS, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: WOMEN’S RIGHTS
AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITIONS 105 (2008).
50. BRADFORD MILLER, RETURNING TO SENECA FALLS: THE FIRST WOMAN’S RIGHTS
CONVENTION & ITS MEANING FOR MEN AND WOMEN TODAY 176 (1995).
51. See DAVIS, supra note 49, at 82.
52. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985) (“The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.” (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982))).
53. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding “that all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
54. See Amy Hinkley, Comment, Scrutinize This!: The Questionable Constitutionality of GenderConscious Admissions Policies Utilized by Public Universities, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 339, 366 n.153 (2010)
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Accordingly, such discrimination is almost always ruled unconstitutional.55
Gender discrimination, on the other hand, is merely subjected to
intermediate scrutiny given that, unlike race, “differences between men and
women may in some circumstances justify different treatment.”56 As the
Court has pointed out, “[t]he truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a
community made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both.”57 Thus, a state may occasionally have need to treat the
two sexes differently, and the intermediate level of scrutiny provides the
state with greater freedom to do just that. For example, applying
intermediate scrutiny, the Court has upheld legislation that required only
males to register for the draft58 and also state laws that only criminalized
acts of statutory rape when perpetrated by males.59 Most recently, the Court
upheld legislation that imposed different requirements on unmarried fathers
and unmarried mothers to transmit U.S. citizenship to children born
abroad.60 For mothers, U.S. citizenship is conferred on the child
automatically; for fathers, certain steps have to be taken before the child
could gain U.S. citizenship.61 The Court ruled that this disparate treatment
nonetheless satisfies Equal Protection:
To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological
differences—such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth
but the father need not be—risks making the guarantee of equal
protection superficial, and so disserving it. Mechanistic
classification of all our differences as stereotypes would operate to
obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real. The
distinction embodied in the statutory scheme here at issue is not
marked by misconception and prejudice, nor does it show
disrespect for either class. The difference between men and women
in relation to the birth process is a real one, and the principle of
(“Racial classifications are considered to be inherently suspect and are, therefore, automatically subject
to strict scrutiny because, among other reasons, people of different races do not have different physical
abilities in the same way that men and women do.”).
55. Such distinctions can only survive “if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests.” Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
56. Lindsey Sacher, Comment, From Stereotypes to Solid Ground: Reframing the Equal
Protection Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and its Application to Gender-Based College Admissions
Policies, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1411, 1416 (2011).
57. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
58. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981).
59. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (“Because virtually all of the
significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young
female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by
nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct.”).
60. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001)
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2012). In 2011, the Court would once again uphold this same genderbased distinction. See Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011).
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equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the problem at
hand in a manner specific to each gender.62
Historically, however, the Court has often sidestepped this equal
protection analysis entirely, finding that the class of men and women at
issue are not even “similarly situated.”63 For example, in Parham v.
Hughes, the Court stated that “[t]he fact is that mothers and fathers of
illegitimate children are not similarly situated.”64 In light of these perceived
differences between mothers and fathers, nonmarital fathers have
historically encountered discriminatory laws. As one scholar explained it,
“Like illegitimate children, unwed fathers historically were presumed to
operate outside the bounds of the conventional household. . . . [T]he
illegitimate child had no claim to parentage and the putative father had no
rights or responsibilities with respect to a child conceived out of
wedlock.”65
Starting in the 1970s, however, the Court began to strike down a
number of laws that discriminated against nonmarital fathers. The case of
Stanley v. Illinois paved the way with the Court striking down an Illinois
law that presumed nonmarital fathers, but not nonmarital mothers or even
marital fathers, to be unfit.66 Later, in Caban v. Mohammed, the Court
would also strike down legislation that required the consent of a nonmarital
mother, but not the nonmarital father, before a child could be adopted.67
Thus, these cases began a trend of Supreme Court jurisprudence whereby,
although the differences between the two sexes are understood and even
recognized in some instances as justifiable reasons for gender-based
discrimination, a state is nonetheless limited in the degree to which it can
discriminate on the basis of gender when it comes to unmarried parents.
With these principles in mind, what follows are two areas of law where
nonmarital fathers are currently facing grave legal disabilities that, due to
the relatively passive role men play in human reproduction, only burden

62. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73.
63. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (“In cases where men and women are not
similarly situated, however, and a statutory classification is realistically based upon the differences in
their situations, this Court has upheld its validity.”).
64. Id. at 355.
65. Allison Anna Tait, A Tale of Three Families: Historical Households, Earned Belonging, and
Natural Connections, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 1377 (2012).
66. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972) (“Procedure by presumption is always
cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the
determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to
past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and
child. It therefore cannot stand.”).
67. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (“We conclude that this undifferentiated
distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption
of a child of theirs is at issue, does not bear a substantial relationship to the State’s asserted interests.”).
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men. What makes these legal disabilities particularly troubling is that: (1)
they pertain to the man’s ability to control his own procreation, and (2) the
man is, in essence, powerless to protect his rights given that he is at the
mercy of the mother.
A. Conscripted Fathers
A man who is the legal father of a child is obligated to provide that
child with financial support.68 As Professor Hubin describes: “The
obligation to financially support a child is one of the elements in the
‘normative bundle’ of paternity—the bundle of rights and responsibilities
typically associated with this concept.”69 Further, much of the law relating
to child support is based on the fact that it is typically in a child’s best
interest to receive financial support from mothers as well as fathers.70 So
strong is this precept that courts will hold a father liable for child support
even in the face of wrongful conduct by the mother. As one court
succinctly put it: “The mother’s alleged fault or wrongful conduct is
irrelevant.”71
Thus, child support is essentially a form of strict liability with the
justification being that “[t]he child is an innocent party, and it is the child’s
interests and welfare” that the court must look to in adjudicating support.72
So strict is this liability that even those men who never consented to the
sexual act that caused the pregnancy are nonetheless liable for support.73 As
one commentator describes, “[w]hile courts have declared that child
support obligations are dependent on voluntary parenthood, they are often
reluctant to look to consent for guidance.”74 Professor Hubin goes even
further, pointing out that, under contemporary legal standards, it has
become a “settled approach” that “genetic relationships establish legal
paternity regardless of whether the genetic fathers gave legal consent, or
were capable of giving legal consent, to an act of sexual intercourse that

68. See Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 30 (2003).
69. Id. at 61.
70. See id. at 35
71. Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993) (quoting Weinberg v.
Omar E., 482 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); see also S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d
1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (“[A]ny wrongful conduct on the part of the mother should not alter
the father’s duty to provide support for the child.”).
72. Hubin, supra note 68, at 55 (quoting S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189).
73. Dana Johnson, Comment, Child Support Obligations that Result from Male Sexual
Victimization: An Examination of the Requirement of Support, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 515, 535 (2005).
74. Id.
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resulted in the pregnancies.”75 Such cases typically arise in two forms:
those involving statutory rape and those involving stolen sperm.
1. Statutory Rape
State legislatures, understanding that most adolescents lack full
emotional, mental, and physical maturity, are rightly concerned with
protecting teens from “unequal, manipulative, or predatory relationships.”76
One of the primary ways in which legislatures attempt to accomplish this
goal is through statutory rape laws, which in essence criminalize sexual
activity with a child who is below the statutorily defined age of consent.77
Thus, age of consent laws, which vary by state, lay out the minimum age at
which a person can legally consent to engage in a sexual act.78 In most
instances,79 engaging in a sexual act with someone below the age of
consent is a criminal act.80
Despite the criminal penalty, when the victim is male, the question also
arises as to whether he should be liable for child support payments should
the rape result in a child. This scenario unfortunately arises somewhat
frequently.81 Nonetheless, without exception, courts have consistently ruled
that the underage father is indeed liable for child support. In the words of
one court, “[i]f voluntary intercourse results in parenthood, then for

75. Hubin, supra note 68, at 55.
76. CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2004).
77. ROBERT L. MADDEX, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 274–75 (2006)
78. Id. at 275; see also Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 334 (2003) (footnote omitted) (“At its most basic,
statutory rape is the carnal knowledge of a person who is deemed underage as proscribed by statute and
who is therefore presumed to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity.”).
79. One notable exception involves a married couple. See generally Kelly C. Connerton,
Comment, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The Victimization of Teens by Their
Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REV. 237, 251 (1997) (examining history of marital rape exemption and
how exemption “continues to excuse the rape of young women and make the prosecution of marital
rapists under state statutory rape laws impossible”).
80. MADDEX, supra note 77, at 275. As one commentator describes: “The law conceives of the
younger partner as categorically incompetent to say either yes or no to sex. Because she is by definition
powerless both personally and legally to resist or to voluntarily relinquish her ‘virtue,’ the state, which
sees its interest in guarding that virtue, resists for her.” JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE
PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX 71 (2002). In most states, statutory rape is a felony, but
statutes typically include age-gap provisions so that consensual teenage sex is either not criminal or
only a misdemeanor. See Meredith Cohen, Note & Comment, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to
Combat Cruel and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 734–35,
748–50 & n.196.
81. Indeed, there are “numerous cases in which an adult woman became pregnant as a result of
sexual relations she initiated with a minor child.” Hubin, supra note 68, at 51 (listing cases); see also
Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of Statutory Rape Pay
Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?, 36 GA. L. REV. 411, 416 n.23 (2002)
(listing cases).
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purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary. This is true even if a
fifteen-year old boy’s parenthood resulted from a sexual assault upon him
within the meaning of the criminal law.”82
Consider, for example, Nathaniel J., who at the age of fifteen was
statutorily raped by a woman named Ricci Jones. Although Nathaniel
described the sexual encounter as “a mutually agreeable act,”83 Jones was
convicted of statutory rape.84 Nonetheless, the district attorney’s office
brought an action against Nathaniel seeking child support and welfare
reimbursement.85 In response, Nathaniel argued that “exacting child
support from a victim of statutory rape violates public policy” in that
“public policy protects [minors] from the effects of sexual exploitation by
an adult.”86 The court, however, rejected Nathaniel’s arguments, finding
that Nathaniel was “not an innocent victim of Jones’s criminal acts.”87
Specifically, the court distinguished between “a party who is injured
through no fault of his or her own and an injured party who willingly
participated in the offense about which a complaint is made.”88 The court
placed Nathaniel in the latter category given that he voluntarily engaged in
sexual intercourse with Jones—“It does not necessarily follow that a minor
over the age of 14 who voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse is a victim
of sexual abuse.”89 Paradoxically, then, the court held that Nathaniel was
liable for child support because he voluntarily engaged in sexual
intercourse despite the fact he was a minor at the time of conception and,
thus, was legally incapable of consenting to such acts.90
In another case, a Michigan court ruled that a fourteen-year-old victim
of sexual assault was likewise liable for child support: “[R]espondent
participated in the act of sexual intercourse that resulted in the conception
of [the child]. Respondent is not absolved from the responsibility to support
82. J.J.G. v. L.H. (In re Paternity of J.L.H.), 441 N.W.2d 273, 276–77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
83. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
84. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 2014), which states that “[a]ny person 21 years of
age or older who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is under 16 years of
age is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony.”).
85. Id. Indeed, in most of the cases presented here, “the child’s rights in these cases have actually
been relinquished to the government, since these cases arise when a county seeks repayment of public
benefits paid on behalf of the child.” Jones, supra note 81, at 449.
86. San Luis Obispo, 57 Cal. Rtpr. 2d at 845. Further, Nathaniel argued that “the reserved child
support order ‘is exactly the exploitation which the Legislature intended to prevent’ because it inflicts
economic loss on a crime victim.” Id.
87. Id. Specifically, the court noted that “[a]fter discussing the matter, he and Jones decided to
have sexual relations. They had sexual intercourse approximately five times over a two-week period.”
Id.
88. Id. (quoting Cynthia M. v. Rodney E., 279 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). According
to the court, it then followed that “[o]ne who is injured as a result of criminal conduct in which he
willingly participated is not a typical crime victim.” Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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the child because [the mother] was technically committing an act of
criminal sexual conduct.”91 The Supreme Court of Kansas reached the
same conclusion in a case involving a male who was only twelve at the
time he was statutorily raped: “This State’s interest in requiring minor
parents to support their children overrides the State’s competing interest in
protecting juveniles from improvident acts, even when such acts may
include criminal activity on the part of the other parent.”92
2. Sexual Assault and Misappropriated Sperm
Male victims of statutory rape are not the only men who, despite not
having consented to a sexual act, have nonetheless been held liable for the
support of the resulting child. After all, “the absence of consent need not
result from force or coercion; it may also result from some form of
ignorance or incapacity.”93 Thus, included in the category of “conscripted
fathers” are also those men who have had their sperm taken and used for
conception without their consent.
To illustrate, recall the case of S.F., the Alabama man who passed out
on T.M.’s (i.e., the mother’s) couch, while attending a party at her house in
1992.94 In the ensuing months, T.M. bragged to friends and acquaintances
that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with S.F. while he was
unconscious and, thus, in her words, S.F. had “saved her a trip to the sperm
bank.”95 In 1994, the State of Alabama, on behalf of T.M., brought an
action against S.F. to collect child support.96 S.F. was found liable and was
ordered to pay not only $106.04 a week from that point onward, but also
$8,960.64 in arrears.97 On appeal, S.F. argued that he should be relieved of
liability given that he was a victim of sexual assault.98 According to S.F.,
“to require him to support the child that resulted from this nonconsensual
intercourse would be to punish him, to deprive him of his property rights,

91. L.M.E. v. A.R.S., 680 N.W.2d 902, 914 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added).
92. State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993) (“This minor child, the
only truly innocent party, is entitled to support from both her parents regardless of their ages.”).
93. Hubin, supra note 68, at 66 (citing Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and
Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 133 (2002)).
94. S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
95. Id. at 1186, 1190. Dr. Lane Layton, an expert witness, testified that “it was her medical
opinion that a man who is intoxicated to the point of losing consciousness is physically capable of
having an erection and ejaculation.” Id.
96. Id. at 1186.
97. Id. at 1188. S.F. was also ordered “to include the child on his medical insurance; to pay onehalf of any medical expenses not covered by insurance; and to pay $300 for the cost of the blood tests.”
Id. at 1186–87.
98. Id. at 1188. S.F. claimed that “he did not have consensual intercourse with T.M. and that he
was a victim of a sexual assault by T.M.” Id.
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and to deny him equal protection under the law.”99 The court, however,
rejected S.F.’s argument, and it did so by—like the statutory rape cases
discussed above100—focusing exclusively on the child’s interest in
receiving support: “The child is an innocent party, and . . . any wrongful
conduct on the part of the mother should not alter the father’s duty to
provide support for the child.”101
In a similar case, a father, Daniel, claimed that the mother, Jennifer,
had engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with him after lacing his
drink with “a date rape drug.”102 In an action to collect child support for the
resulting child, the lower court had allowed Daniel to introduce evidence of
nonconsent but required him “to prove all factual issues by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence.”103 The jury ultimately found that
Daniel’s act of sexual intercourse with Jennifer was involuntary, yet
nonetheless still required Daniel to pay child support.104 On appeal, the
appellate court agreed and held that “[t]he paramount goal of any child
support decision is to secure the best interests of the child.”105 According to
the court, the child “was not at fault [and thus] was entitled to receive child
support from both parents.”106 The appellate court went one step further,
however, and held that the lower court erred in even putting the issue of
consent to the jury.107 Instead, the appellate court ruled that the only
question the jury had to answer was whether Daniel was Derek’s father:
“When the court determined that Daniel was Derek’s father, Daniel’s right
to a jury trial was extinguished.”108
A final example of stolen sperm is that of Emile, whose story is
somewhat different, however, in that he did consent to sexual activity with
the mother.109 Nonetheless, Emile claimed that he merely consented to oral
sex with the mother and never consented to her use of his sperm for

99. Id. S.F. “further contended that the court, acting in equity, could abate any child support
payments due because of what he alleged to be T.M.’s sexual assault upon him.” Id. at 1187.
100. See supra notes 82, 83, 91, and 92.
101. S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189 (noting that the purpose of the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act “is
to provide for the general welfare of the child; any wrongful conduct on the part of the mother should
not alter the father’s duty to provide support for the child”).
102. State v. Daniel G.H. (In re Paternity of Derek S.H.), No. 01-0473, 2002 WL 265006, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2002) (unpublished table decision).
103. Id.
104. Id. Specifically, the court ordered Daniel to pay child support in the amount of $100 per
week. Id.
105. Id. at *2 (citing Luciani v. Montemurro-Luciani, 544 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. 1996)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Id.
109. See State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d, 1032, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1997). Emile testified that one
evening “‘this woman came upon me in the waiting room and she told me that she wanted to perform
oral sex on me,’ and ‘as being any male would, I did not refuse.’” Id.
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purposes of self-insemination.110 In that case, during the Fall of 1983,
Emile was visiting his parents in a hospital when Debra Rojas, a nurse,
offered to perform oral sex on him, provided he wore a condom.111 Emile
consented but claimed that subsequently Debra had, without Emile’s
knowledge or consent, used Emile’s sperm to successfully impregnate
herself.112 Eleven years later, the state filed an action against Emile to
collect child support.113 Despite his objections, the lower court ordered
Emile to pay $436.81 per month, $17,909.21 in arrears, and 5% court
costs.114 The appellate court then affirmed, relying solely on the fact that
paternity testing revealed Emile to be the father.115 According to the court:
“The fact of paternity obliges a father to support his child.”116 As to the
allegations that Debra had engaged in self-insemination without Emile’s
consent, the court dismissed the point, merely noting that “defendant’s own
testimony showed that he had some sort of sexual contact with [the]
plaintiff around the time frame of alleged conception.”117 Thus, the fact that
there was any sexual contact was sufficient to hold Emile liable for child
support.
An appellate court in Illinois reached a similar result in Phillips v.
Irons.118 In that case, Dr. Richard Phillips and Dr. Sharon Irons began a
dating relationship, during which time the couple engaged in oral sex on
three occasions.119 The two never had sexual intercourse because Irons told
Phillips that she was menstruating and thus needed to refrain from vaginal
intercourse.120 However, unbeknownst to Phillips, Irons used Phillips’s
semen (obtained from oral sex) to successfully inseminate herself.121
Subsequently, Irons gave birth to a daughter and, soon thereafter, sought an
order of child support against Phillips.122 After DNA testing proved that
110. Id. According to Emile, Debra asked him to wear a condom as a condition to providing him
with oral sex, “but he denied having any knowledge of what she planned to do with the sperm.” Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (“Several months later, plaintiff started insinuating that he might be the father of her
child, and although he did not personally see her do it, he believed that she may have inseminated
herself.”).
113. Id. at 1033.
114. Id. at 1033–34.
115. Id. at 1035–36, 1041.
116. Id. at 1034 (citing Dubroc v. Dubroc, 388 So. 2d 377, 379–80 (La. 1980)).
117. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added).
118. Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005).
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id. Further, “[d]uring their relationship, the parties discussed the possibility of having
children only after they married. Plaintiff informed defendant he did not wish to have children prior to
marriage, and intended to use a condom if and when they engaged in sexual intercourse.” Id.
121. Id. (“On or around February 19, 1999, and March 19, 1999, defendant ‘intentionally
engaged in oral sex with [plaintiff] so that she could harvest [his] semen and artificially inseminate
herself,’ and ‘did artificially inseminate herself.’”) (alteration in original).
122. Id.
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Phillips was in fact the biological father, the court awarded child support to
Irons in the amount of $800 a month, which was later increased to $1,600 a
month.123 The court paid no consideration to the mother’s alleged
wrongdoing.
In sum, in cases involving a father who claims that his sperm was
stolen by the mother, whether this “theft” occurred during nonconsensual
intercourse or whether the sperm was harvested from sexual activity other
than intercourse and then surreptitiously used for insemination, the courts
have universally reached the same result. Specifically, the lack of consent
is no bar to an obligation to pay child support. In other words, “[i]f a man
intends to have sexual intercourse with a woman and a baby results, the
man is liable for child support. The sexual intercourse in these cases is
‘factually voluntary’ and thus intentional, even if it is nonconsensual in the
criminal sense.”124
B. Thwarted Fathers
Conscripted fathers are not the only class of men whose reproductive
freedom has been compromised by the actions of women. Indeed, the law
not only permits women to force fatherhood upon men—again, those who
never consented to the procreative act that created the child—but at the
other end of the spectrum, the law likewise permits women to effectively
thwart men’s attempts to actually father a biological child. As a result,
these men permanently lose their parental rights to children they, in many
instances, never even had the opportunity to meet.
To understand how such a situation can arise, it is first necessary to
examine two areas of law as they are currently applied to nonmarital
fathers: substantive due process and adoption law.
1. The Biology-Plus Doctrine
Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of
their children.125 To have that right, however, a person must first qualify as

123. See Chris Hack, Man Claiming Stolen Sperm Ordered to Double Child Support, CHI. SUNTIMES, Mar. 14, 2005, at 24.
124. Laura Wish Morgan, It’s Ten O’Clock: Do You Know Where Your Sperm Are? Toward a
Strict Liability Theory of Parentage, DIVORCE LITIG., Mar–Apr. 2002, available at http://
www.childsupportguidelines.com/articles/art199903.html.
125. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”)
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the child’s legal parent.126 For mothers, simply giving birth to the child is
almost always sufficient to confer legal parenthood.127 When it comes to
nonmarital fathers, however, simply being a biological father is insufficient
to allow the man to claim legal fatherhood over a child. Instead, something
more is required. This requirement is known as the “biology-plus” rule and
was developed by the Supreme Court in a series of four cases starting with
Stanley v. Illinois128 in 1972 and culminating with Lehr v. Robertson129 in
1983. According to the Court, “[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown
from the biological connection between parent and child. They require
relationships more enduring.”130 Thus, in the case of nonmarital fathers,
“[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by ‘coming forward to participate in the
rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”131 In other words, a
biological connection gives a man an opportunity to develop a liberty
interest in his child, but such an interest will only acquire constitutional
protection if the man promptly comes forward and acts as a father to the
child.
The biology-plus doctrine comes into play when a nonmarital,
biological father desires to involve himself in the child’s life. Typically,
these cases concern a biological father who is attempting to block the
child’s adoption by another male. In contrast, when it is another party (or,
most frequently, the state) who is attempting to adjudicate a man’s
paternity—typically for purposes of ordering him to pay child support—a
biological connection is all that is needed.132 Thus, it is only when a man is
claiming the benefits of fatherhood that he must satisfy the biology-plus
rule. In other words, as one commentator put it, “[t]he Supreme Court

126. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (reasoning that, while generally parents
have fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause to direct their children’s upbringing, no such
right existed here because “this [was] not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought,
actual or legal custody of his child.”).
127. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The mother
carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear.”); Nancy E. Dowd,
Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 915 (2006)
(“With respect to mothers, it is assumed that biological and social motherhood coexist.”).
128. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
129. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
130. Id. at 260 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
131. Id. at 261 (citation omitted).
132. See generally Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology
‘Plus’ Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 47, 48 (2004) (“While the Court held that a biological connection alone established the requisite link
in benefits cases, the Court found that something more was necessary in personal association cases, i.e.,
‘biology plus.’”).
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[o]nly [h]elps [t]hose [w]ho [h]elp [t]hemselves.”133 At first blush, this
principle appears quite sound. Unlike the mother, who was pregnant with
the child for nine months, a father can beget a child with very little
involvement and participation on his part. In fact, his role may have in
essence been no more than sperm donor, having little to no contact with the
birth mother following insemination. In such instances, it would be difficult
to justify a system whereby a man who failed to come forward and act as a
father is nonetheless permitted to intervene at the last minute and thwart an
attempt to place the child with a man who has demonstrated a desire to
fulfill that role in the child’s life. In that respect, then, the biology-plus rule
is a mechanism for balancing the father’s rights with the child’s best
interest in finding a stable family unit.134
A problem arises, however, when the biological father either did not
know he fathered a child, or he did know of the child’s existence but was
essentially blocked by the mother from seeing the child. In either case, the
father is thus unable to come forward and demonstrate the necessary
commitment to the child. As a result, a court is then free to terminate his
parental rights without his consent or, indeed, even his knowledge. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on how the biology-plus rule operates in
such situations, and given the way in which the law pertaining to adoption
has evolved—as explained below—such situations unfortunately arise quite
frequently.
2. Adoption Law and the Putative Father Registry
When placing a child up for adoption, unwed mothers are generally not
required to identify the father.135 To require otherwise, many argue, would
infringe the mother’s right to privacy.136 As one advocate of nondisclosure
described, requiring the unwed mother to identify the father would
“sublimate[] the unwed mother’s rights and interests to those of the
putative father, trading her dignity in exchange for the diminished chance
that her forced disclosure will identify an earnest father eager to embrace

133. Kevin Lytle, Note, Rock-a-bye Baby: When Determining How and Where the Cradle Should
Fall, Nebraska “Blows It”—An Examination of Unwed Fathers’ Rights Regarding Their Children and
Nebraska’s Infringement of Those Rights, 74 NEB. L. REV. 180, 194 (1995).
134. See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1047 (Minn. 2002) (“The overarching goal is to establish procedures that advance the
best interests of the child by quickly providing her a stable and permanent home and by avoiding
disruption of an adoptive placement because a father untimely asserts his paternity.”).
135. But see Cecily L. Helms & Phyllis C. Spence, Take Notice Unwed Fathers: An Unwed
Mother’s Right to Privacy in Adoption Proceedings, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 10 (2005) (detailing
some statutory schemes that arguably could pressure the mother to disclose the identity of the father).
136. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 408–09 & n.17 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[Q]uestions relating to the adequacy of notice to absent fathers could invade the mother’s privacy.”‘).
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his parental responsibility.”137 Further, as one court pointed out, “[t]here are
numerous situations in which an unmarried birth mother would be justified
in keeping information from a putative father, including situations where
the woman has fled an abusive relationship, where the pregnancy was the
result of nonconsensual intercourse, or where the putative father poses a
danger to the child.”138
For these reasons, it is generally the sole responsibility of the putative
father to protect his rights, which he can do by coming forward soon after
the child’s birth and obtaining a paternity adjudication.139 Or, he can simply
come forward and act as a father to the child.140 Most states require that
men who have undertaken such actions are entitled to notice of any
adoption proceedings involving the child.141 Once again, however, the
problem arises when the father does not even know that the child exists or
has been thwarted in his attempts to build a relationship with that child.
Nonetheless, under the law, it remains the father’s sole responsibility to
protect himself.
To do so, a father must typically turn to the state’s putative father
registry, a form of which has been adopted in a majority of states.142 In
essence, the registry sets up a system whereby a male can protect his right
to receive notice of any adoption involving his biological children. He does
so by submitting his name to the appropriate registry along with the name
of the potential mother and, if known, the name of the child.143 State law
then requires that, should the mother attempt to give the child up for
adoption, a search of the registry must first be conducted and any matching

137. Helms & Spence, supra note 135, at 16.
138. Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 368 (2002).
139. See BROWNE C. LEWIS, PAPA’S BABY: PATERNITY AND ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 8 (2012)
(“An adjudication of paternity protects a man’s legal right to parent his child.”).
140. See LENORA M. LAPIDUS, EMILY J. MARTIN & NAMITA LUTHRA, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO WOMEN’S RIGHTS 265 (4th ed. 2009) (“In general, when a
father has had a ‘substantial relationship’ with the child . . . the law will require the father’s consent to
adoption.”).
141. Id.
142. See generally Beck, supra note 134 (including a chart of the 33 states). In states that have
not set up such a system, the state relies on the mother and state investigators to try and determine the
father’s identity. Those suspected of being the father are then contacted directly, or if no men can be
identified, the state provides constructive notification through publication. See Kimberly Barton,
Comment, Who’s Your Daddy?: State Adoption Statutes and the Unknown Biological Father, 32 CAP.
U. L. REV. 113, 114 (2003) (“States that choose to protect the unknown father’s inchoate interest in
assuming a responsible role in the future of his child take various approaches to protect this interest, but
the two predominant approaches they employ are putative father registries and publication notice
requirements.”); see also Alison S. Pally, Note, Father by Newspaper Ad: The Impact of In Re The
Adoption of a Minor Child on the Definition of Fatherhood, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 190
(2004). Hardly any states, however, require the mother to disclose the father’s identity for the reasons
noted earlier. See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
143. See generally Beck, supra note 134.
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registrant be notified of the upcoming proceeding so that he might
intervene should he choose to do so.144
Despite how reasonable this system might sound, the putative father
registry has a number of significant flaws. First of all, few men are actually
aware that such registries even exist and are thus unlikely to avail
themselves to the “protection” they afford.145 More problematic, however,
is the fact that the registries are state-specific.146 Thus, to adequately protect
himself, the putative father must know not the state in which the mother
resides but the state where she plans to give the child up for adoption.147 As
discussed below, a mother can simply flee her state of residence and travel
to another state to surrender her child for adoption. Unless the putative
father actually registered in that specific state, he will not be entitled to
notice of any adoptions concerning the child. Additionally, any ability he
might have had to challenge the adoption is now permanently foreclosed.
The following cases illustrate the degree to which the states’ reliance
on these registries, instead of assisting biological fathers, has become a
powerful tool for mothers who wish to give a child up for adoption without
the biological father’s knowledge.
3. Examples of Thwarted Fathers
The story with which I began this article—that of Katie Carton and
Dale Heidbreder—is but one example of the harm that can arise when the
biology-plus rule intersects with the law of adoption.148 Again, Heidbreder
had no idea that the mother of his child had moved to Minnesota until
thirty-one days after she had given birth there to the couple’s child.149 In

144. See KERRY O’HALLORAN, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 274 (2d ed. 2009) (“Once registered, such a father must be notified where
feasible that adoption proceedings in respect of his child have been, or will shortly be, commenced.”).
145. Lytle, supra note 133, at 194; Karen R. Thompson, Comment, The Putative Father’s Right
to Notice of Adoption Proceedings: Has Georgia Finally Solved the Adoption Equation?, 47 EMORY
L.J. 1475, 1507 (1998) (noting that “it is unlikely that many fathers will have the requisite knowledge to
protect their rights”).
146. See Barton, supra note 142, at 128 (“Since putative father registries are established by state
law, their particular features vary from state to state. Specifically, state statutes differ on the time frame
within which they require a putative father to register, the consequence of the father’s failure to register,
and the permissible exceptions to the father’s failure to register.”); Margaret Ryznar, Two to Tango,
One in Limbo: A Comparative Analysis of Fathers’ Rights in Infant Adoptions, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 89, 95
(2009) (“If the baby’s mother uses an out-of-state adoption agency or moves to a different state, she
avoids triggering the database.”).
147. See Beck, supra note 134, at 1033.
148. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
149. Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Minn. 2002) (“While Carton maintained
contact with Heidbreder through e-mail, she did not tell him where she was and she instructed her
family and friends not to give Heidbreder any information about her location. Although Heidbreder
asked for information, Carton’s family and friends refused to tell him where Carton was. Heidbreder
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fact, one of two promises that Carton made to Heidbreder was that she
would never move to Minnesota150—the other promise being that she
would never put the child up for adoption.151 Regardless, he did eventually
learn the truth on that thirty-first day, at which point Carton spoke to
Heidbreder on the telephone, telling him of her actions and that “it was too
late for him to stop the adoption.”152 Heidbreder immediately registered
with the Minnesota putative father registry, but he was, of course, one day
late.153 According to the court, that one day was all it took for him to lose
his parental rights.154
On appeal, Heidbreder argued that he should be excused from his delay
given that the mother failed to notify him of her location and also failed to
identify him as the father on the birth certificate.155 The court, however,
rejected this argument noting that “Carton had no duty to inform
Heidbreder of her location or otherwise assist him in protecting his
rights.”156 As the court further explained:
We decline to impose a fiduciary duty on an unmarried birth
mother to disclose her location to the putative father even if she
knows he wants to know her location or establish a relationship
with his child. . . . Furthermore, there is no need to impose such a
duty on the birth mother in the interest of protecting a putative
father’s interests because the legislature has provided a means for
the putative father to assert his interest in his child independent of
the birth mother through registration with the Minnesota Fathers’
Adoption Registry. Because a putative father is able to protect his
interest in his child without any assistance or information from the
birth mother, the birth mother is not in a position superior to the

testified in his deposition that he believed Carton had returned to Illinois and he never considered the
possibility that Carton was in Minnesota because of Carton’s poor relationship with her mother.”).
150. Id. at 375 n.15 (“Heidbreder knew Carton’s relationship with her mother was strained and
Carton told Heidbreder she would not move to Minnesota with her mother.”).
151. Id. at 360 (“While respondents dispute whether Carton made an affirmative promise to
Heidbreder not to put the child up for adoption, we view the facts in the light most favorable to
Heidbreder as the nonmoving party at the summary judgment stage and assume, for purposes of our
decision, that Carton did in fact make such a promise to Heidbreder during their discussion of
adoption.”).
152. Id. at 362.
153. Id. (“The same day, Heidbreder found a website with information on the Minnesota Fathers’
Adoption Registry and completed and mailed the necessary forms.”).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 366.
156. Id. at 370.
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putative father such that she should be required to provide him with
information regarding her location.157
Naturally, Heidbreder argued that the registry was unable to protect
him in this case given that he did not know that Carton had left the state.158
The court rejected that argument, weakly noting that “while Heidbreder did
not know with certainty where Carton was, he had sufficient information to
put him on notice that it was possible” she was in Minnesota.159 Even so,
the court deemed Heidbreder’s lack of knowledge irrelevant, ruling that
“the fact that Carton concealed her location from Heidbreder does not
excuse his failure to timely register” with the state’s putative father
registry.160 Finally, as to Carton’s misrepresentations to Heidbreder that she
would never put the child up for adoption and would never move to
Minnesota, the court simply ruled that “it was unreasonable for Heidbreder
to rely on Carton’s promise.”161
In other cases, a nonmarital father promptly registered in multiple
states—states where the mother was thought most likely to go—yet
nonetheless lost parental rights when the mother instead fled to an
unexpected state. For example, in O’Dea v. Olea, Cody O’Dea and Ashley
Olea began an intimate relationship in Sheridan, Wyoming.162
Subsequently, after Ms. Olea moved to Buffalo, Wyoming, Mr. O’Dea
learned that she was pregnant.163 After traveling to visit Ms. Olea and
learning that she was considering abortion, Mr. O’Dea talked her out of it,
offering to help with her expenses and with providing her a home.164 A few
157. Id. at 368. (“Because we decline to impose a fiduciary duty on a birth mother to notify a
putative father of her location at the time of birth, Carton had no duty to disclose her location to
Heidbreder, and thus Heidbreder’s claim of fraudulent nondisclosure fails as a matter of law.”).
158. Id. at 366.
159. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). The court justified this statement by stating:
Heidbreder knew Carton had relatives in Minnesota and that her mother was moving to
Minnesota. While Heidbreder knew Carton’s relationship with her mother was strained and
Carton told Heidbreder she would not move to Minnesota with her mother, it is reasonable
to recognize that there was at least the possibility that a pregnant “scared and confused” 18
year old woman might request assistance from her mother or out-of-state relatives for
assistance if she did not want the birth father to know her location.
Id. at 375 n.15. The dissent would characterize the majority’s argument as “overly simplistic” and
“speculative, at best.” Id. at 380.
160. Id. at 367.
161. Id. at 371. Ironically, the court made the point that, because Carton, concealed her
whereabouts from him, he should have been put on notice that she’d likely changed her mind about
adoption. Id. (“[S]uch actions by a birth mother, if anything, are consistent with a birth mother’s
decision to put her child up for adoption without interference from the putative father and would put a
putative father on notice of the need to protect his rights.”).
162. 217 P.3d 704, 706 (Utah 2009).
163. Id. Ms. Olea, however, had actually become aware of her pregnancy prior to moving to
Buffalo. Id.
164. Id.
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weeks later, Ms. Olea contacted him, telling him that she had suffered a
miscarriage.165 Several months later, however, Mr. O’Dea would learn she
had lied about the miscarriage and that she was also considering giving the
child up for adoption.166
To protect his rights to the child, with whom he desired to have a
parent-child relationship, Mr. O’Dea registered with both the Wyoming and
Montana putative father registries.167 What Mr. O’Dea did not know,
however, was that Ms. Olea had subsequently traveled to Utah, where she
put the child up for adoption.168 Mr. O’Dea tried diligently to locate Ms.
Olea, who upon learning of his efforts, finally called him (from a blocked
number) and said:
You will listen and you will not speak. First of all I want you to
stop harassing me and that includes your mother. I am in Utah.
You will not father this child. You will pay child support until the
child is in college. You will never see this baby. Do you
understand?169
The fact that Ms. Olea referred to child support made Mr. O’Dea
believe she had abandoned her plan to give the child up for adoption.170 A
month later, however, Mr. O’Dea learned of the adoption in Utah.171 The
next day, Mr. O’Dea wrote the attorney who handled the adoption but was
subsequently informed that he had missed the deadline for asserting his
parental rights in Utah.172 Mr. O’Dea filed an action to establish paternity,
but his claim was rejected.173 The Supreme Court of Utah would eventually
rule that, even if she were only there temporarily, the fact that Ms. Olea
165. Id. (“At the time Mr. O’Dea believed this statement to be true . . . .”).
166. Id. (“[I]n mid-May of the next year, Mr. O’Dea learned from a friend that Ms. Olea was
possibly still pregnant. Mr. O’Dea contacted Ms. Olea and discovered that she was still pregnant and
was planning on placing the child for adoption.”).
167. Id. He registered in Montana as well thinking that she might use the LDS Family Services
agency located there. Id. In addition, “Mr. O’Dea also sent a letter to Dennis Ashton of LDS Family
Services in Utah informing him of his intent to maintain a relationship with the child.” Id. Mr. O’Dea
did so “on the belief that Mr. Ashton was the regional director of LDS Family Services in Montana,
Wyoming, and Utah.” Id.
168. Id. at 706–07.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 707. During the brief call, Mr. O’Dea actually asked Ms. Olea if she meant she was
giving the child up for adoption. She responded with, “If you understand what I have told you, that is all
I have to say.” Id.
171. Id. (“Mr. O’Dea and his family created an Internet Website seeking information about the
infant. Six days later, Ms. Olea’s mother left a message on the Website that the child was born in Utah,
placed for adoption, and the attorney was Larry S. Jenkins.”).
172. Id. Specifically, the attorney informed O’Dea that his “action was too late because, under
Utah law, he was required to file a paternity action in Utah within twenty days after becoming aware of
a ‘qualifying circumstance,’ which in this case was that Ms. Olea temporarily resided in Utah.” Id.
173. Id. at 707–08.
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once mentioned to Mr. O’Dea that she was in Utah should have put him on
notice not only of her location, but also of the possibility that the child
might be given up for adoption in Utah.174 Thus, despite the fact that Mr.
O’Dea had tried for months to locate Ms. Olea and had even registered in
two different states—because he failed to timely take action in Utah—his
paternity claim was forever foreclosed.
IV. WHY FEMINISTS SHOULD BE CONCERNED
In her book, Split Decisions, Professor Janet Halley points out that
feminists sometimes take an overly narrow view of feminism, viewing it as
the following triad: “women are injured, they do not cause any social harm,
and men, who injure women, are immune from harm.”175 Professor Halley
instead posits that there is indeed a “dark side” to feminism and this “dark
side includes its vanquished, its prisoners of war, the interests that pay the
taxes it has levied and owe the rents it has imposed.”176 In short, what
Professor Halley describes as “[f]eminism with blood on its hands.”177
Professor Halley offers these observations in support of her theory that
occasionally feminism should take a break178 from looking at the world
through a lens of simultaneous male power and female subordination so as
to allow its members to realize what collateral harms they may be
causing—harms that might be damaging to even feminism itself. As
Professor Halley puts it:
When feminist theory refuses to own its will to power, when it
insists that the prodigals must be converged back into feminism, it
commits itself to a theoretical stance that makes it hard for
feminists to see around corners of their own construction. Unless it
Takes a Break from itself, it can’t see injury to men. It can’t see
injury to men by women. It can’t see other interests, other forms of
174. Id. at 715 (“The statement ‘I am in Utah’ placed Mr. O’Dea on inquiry notice that Ms. Olea
was residing in Utah, even if on a temporary basis. His compliance with other states’ paternity laws do
not overcome this notice.”). But see Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B.), 308 P.3d
382, 399 (2012) (retreating somewhat from O’Dea’s requirement of inquiry notice and instead holding
that “it cannot be enough to simply establish that the father had ‘notice’ in the sense of suspicion
sufficient to trigger a further inquiry”).
175. HALLEY, supra note 24, at 320.
176. Id. at 32–33.
177. Id.; see also Brenda Cossman, Dan Danielsen, Janet Halley & Tracy Higgins, Gender,
Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 609 (2003)
(“[F]eminism is definitionally against domination; and if it has dominated, if it has caused harm, it must
chasten itself.”)
178. As to what she means by “taking a break,” Halley clarifies the phrase as follows: “Not kill it,
supersede it, abandon it; immure, immolate, or bury it—merely spend some time outside it exploring
theories of sexuality, inhabiting realities, and imagining political goals that do not fall within its terms.”
HALLEY, supra note 24, at 10.
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power, other justice projects. It insists that all justice projects will
track a subordination model. And this refusal to see, sustained
while feminism imposes costs on interests and projects outside its
purview, gives us a textbook case of bad faith.179
To the extent feminism can be defined as only being concerned with
female subordination at the hands of men, I would agree that perhaps a
break might be in order so that feminists can see other harms that are
resulting—harms like those under discussion here. However, this Article
need not go that far because, even if we only limit feminist concern to that
narrow area, the interests at stake here are nonetheless quite damaging to
both men and women—in some ways more directly than others, but in all
instances eroding many of the rights for which feminists have long fought.
Chief among them is the fundamental right to procreate, which of course
includes the right to elect not to procreate—a right that resides with each
individual, regardless of gender.180 As discussed above, the current state of
the law has, at the very least, compromised that right as it relates to
nonmarital fathers.181 Even leaving aside the constitutional question,
however, it is the position of this Article that this imbalance of rights is an
issue with which feminists should be very much concerned for a number of
reasons.
1. Constitutes a Form of Modern Day Coverture
This Article began with a discussion of common law coverture, the
system whereby husbands were permitted to control a great number of their
wives’ legal rights—rights a husband might choose to extend to her, in his
sole discretion, if and when he saw fit.182 Despite the attempts to justify this
practice as benefitting wives and despite the fact that some husbands did
likely treat their wives quite generously, the practice instead posed an
enormous disability to women and their attempts to be treated as equals.183
Feminists fought hard to have these laws repealed, and in the process
revealed the harms that arise when one gender is permitted to serve as
gatekeeper to the legal rights of the other. After all, the greatest harm that
flowed from coverture lay, not so much in its application to specific

179. Id. at 33.
180. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
181. See supra Part III.
182. See supra Part II.
183. See supra Part II.
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marriages, but the fact that the male member of the marriage was even
given that level of control in the first place.
Sadly, a similar mechanism has emerged in the way the law treats the
reproductive rights of unmarried men. Specifically, as illustrated by the
cases discussed earlier, an unwed male can be forced into fatherhood184 or
he can be denied the right to legally father his own offspring185 simply
through actions the mother might decide to take. Admittedly, the area of
law I am discussing is less overt and much more narrow than the vast array
of legal disabilities that coverture imposed on women. Nonetheless, the
right under discussion here—the right to procreate—is one that is
fundamental.186 Further, and most relevant to this discussion, even if this
area of law in actuality only affects a relatively small number of men, that
is precisely why feminist legal scholars should be particularly concerned.
As Cynthia Farina once said:
[T]he meaning and value of rules and institutions can be
discovered only by understanding how they affect the people
within them. [Feminism] typically understands knowledge as
nonfinal—that is, as expanded by increasing perspective and
seeking out voices on the margins. Therefore, ends and means must
constantly be reassessed as new information is acquired.187
After all, even if they merely represent a group on the margins, the
deprivations these men are facing are significant.
2. Undermines a Basic Tenet of Feminist Jurisprudence—Bodily
Integrity
The fact that the current state of the law might be characterized as a
contemporary form of coverture is, in itself, insufficient to justify great
concern. After all, when talking about family units and reproduction, it is
exceedingly difficult to balance the conflicting interests of the various
people involved. Thus, a natural reaction to saying that the reproductive
rights outlined above bear some resemblance to coverture might be that
perhaps the law is a justified attempt to bestow greater power on mothers in
order to make up ground and help balance out the subordination women
have endured (and continue to endure) for so much of this nation’s history.
However, additional considerations warrant heightened concern over the
184. See supra Part III.A.
185. See supra Part III.B.
186. See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (describing the ability to procreate as “one of the basic civil rights of man”).
187. Cynthia R. Farina, Getting From Here to There, 1991 DUKE L.J. 689, 707 (emphasis added).
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current state of the law—considerations very much at the heart of feminist
jurisprudence.
First, the control that the law has given mothers in cases discussed
above188 pertains to reproductive freedom, which in turn, implicates bodily
autonomy. As one scholar put it, “[r]eproductive freedom is, in the final
analysis, the freedom not merely to experience pleasure and seek meaning
through reproduction, but also the freedom to take on responsibilities,
including the responsibility to limit one’s bodily autonomy and one’s
activities for the child’s sake.”189 And although feminists might disagree on
the full scope of decisions encompassed by bodily autonomy, few would
argue that reproductive autonomy is not of critical importance,
underscoring many of the legal fights feminists have waged in the name of
gender equality.190
The legal fight that comes most readily to mind is that of abortion—a
legal battle that continues to this very day. Those feminists involved in this
fight continue to make the point that the right to abortion flows from the
constitutional right to privacy and its concern with reproductive and bodily
autonomy.191 To paint this right as a one-way street, one that only benefits
women, would greatly undermine its force. On the contrary, the argument
is very much strengthened when it is likewise advanced to protect the
reproductive autonomy of males. In other words, it is harder to claim a
robust constitutional right in that area while turning a blind eye to men—
like those detailed earlier in this Article—who have either been forced into
fatherhood or thwarted in their attempts to become fathers.192 Further, to
only selectively push for this level of autonomy could give the appearance
of bad faith. And, as Professor Halley warns:
Operating in bad faith can have other pretty acute downsides. It can
produce rage and distrust among the unacknowledged bearers of
the costs of one’s activities. . . . Suspending this bad faith might
enable feminism to participate in a much more expansive political
188. See supra Part III.
189. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 463–64 (1983).
190. See, e.g., CHERYL L. MEYER, THE WANDERING UTERUS: POLITICS AND THE REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS OF WOMEN 81 (1997) (“[M]any feminists fear that regulating surrogacy may undermine the
right to bodily autonomy that women fought so hard to acquire.”).
191. See generally, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007); Cass
R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992).
192. See supra Part III.
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engagement with its own effects, its own imagined constituency,
and other political projects it professes to care about.193
In making the above comparison to the abortion fight, it is important to
note that abortion restrictions are hardly comparable to the deprivations
faced by some unwed fathers. Those are different things altogether. Instead,
the point here is merely that, to the degree abortion rests on an argument
that all should have reproductive freedom and bodily autonomy, perhaps
the cases discussed in this Article have greater significance and, thus, can
lend some greater force to the development and perpetuation of that
constitutional right. Further, although this Article does favor giving unwed
fathers greater rights as it relates to their children, such rights should be
strictly limited to children who have already been born. It is not the intent
of this Article to in any way suggest that fathers (regardless of marital
status) should have a legal say in decisions relating to abortion.
3. Promotes Gender Stereotypes
Within feminist legal jurisprudence, there exists a rich source of
literature on the harms that flow from sex stereotypes.194 And one need
only look at the development of Equal Protection jurisprudence to see that
it is a message that has not gone ignored by the Supreme Court. As Justice
Brennan once explained: “Legislative classifications which distribute
benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of
reinforcing the stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their
need for special protection.”195 For this reason, even the language of Title
VII has been construed to include discrimination on the basis of sex
stereotyping: “In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”196
So concerned with entrenching and advancing sexual stereotypes,
feminists have frequently advocated for gender-neutral language.197 In fact,
193. HALLEY, supra note 24, at 343–44. Thus, “[w]hile feminism is committed to affirming and
identifying itself with female injury, it may thereby, unintentionally, intensify it.” Id. at 346.
194. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at
Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757 (2013); Morvareed Z. Salehpour, Election 2008: Sexism Edition: The
Problem of Sex Stereotyping, 19 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 117 (2012); Cary Franklin, The AntiStereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).
195. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
196. L.A. Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
197. See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law:
Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 8 (2008) (“According to the theory of
gender neutrality, differences between men and women should be ignored in the law because equality
means being treated the ‘same as’ men regardless of gender difference.”).
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feminists have even attacked those laws that single out women for
protection on the basis that such laws actually hurt women in the long term,
labeling them as unequal and, thus, requiring special protections.198 As
Ruth Bader Ginsburg warned, while advocating for the Equal Rights
Amendment in the 1970s, one must “perceive laws for ‘women only’ as
ultimately harmful to the group they purport to protect, and favors as
characteristically entailing an accompanying detriment.”199 And, indeed,
the Supreme Court has struck down a number of laws that singularly
imposed burdens on men on the basis that such laws actually promote
damaging gender stereotypes about women. For instance, in striking down
the Mississippi University for Women’s practice of only admitting women
to its nursing program, Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Court, ruled
that “MUW’s policy of excluding males from admission to the School of
Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an
exclusively woman’s job.”200 Likewise, in Orr v. Orr, the Court struck
down a state law that required only husbands to pay alimony on the basis
that such laws “effectively announc[e] the State’s preference for an
allocation of family responsibilities under which the wife plays a dependent
role, and as [such] seek[] for their objective the reinforcement of that model
among the State’s citizens.”201
Feminists have likewise lobbied for changes to laws that offer
protections for women but not men on the basis that failing to protect both
would perpetuate pernicious female stereotypes. The law of statutory rape
is one such example. Historically, most statutory rape laws only protected
underage females: “[t]hey punished a male who had sexual intercourse with
a female, who was not his wife, under the age of consent.”202 The primary
purpose behind these laws was to protect a father’s property interest in his
daughter’s chastity so as to attract more advantageous suitors.203 Over time,
however, the laws became less about property and more about protecting
children.204 Feminists were largely responsible for this shift, and one of the
key ways in which they effectuated this change was by successfully
lobbying state legislatures to include underage males within the protection

198. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1
(1975).
199. Id. at 15.
200. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982).
201. 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
202. COCCA, supra note 76, at 9; see also Michael J. Higdon, Queer Teens and Legislative
Bullies: The Cruel and Invidious Discrimination Behind Heterosexist Statutory Rape Laws, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 195, 225–27 (2008).
203. COCCA, supra note 76, at 11 (“The idea behind such laws at the time was less about the
ability or lack thereof to consent to such activity on the part of the female, and more about protecting
white females and their premarital chastity—a commodity—as property.”) (citation omitted).
204. Id. at 12.

4 HIGDON 507-549 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Marginalized Fathers and Demonized Mothers

1/22/2015 1:03 PM

537

of statutory rape laws.205 Feminists did so despite the fact that the Supreme
Court had ruled that such discrimination satisfied heightened scrutiny.206
In pushing for this change, feminists were motivated by a number of
concerns, and protecting young males was certainly high on that list.207
However, many feminists also felt that “gender-specific laws inscribed the
stereotypes of male-as-aggressor and female-as-victim in the realm of
sexuality”208 and likewise presented “young females as a monolithic group
unable to make decisions about their own bodies.”209 Persuaded by these
arguments, states began making statutory rape laws gender-neutral.210 As
Michelle Oberman describes: “Rather than focus on a gendered notion of
power in sexual relations, they decided to isolate and criminalize sexual
conduct which they felt raised a presumption of coercion.”211
Just as the failure of statutory rape laws to protect men only served to
codify sex stereotypes, the same can be said of the law’s current failure to
equally protect the reproductive freedom of unmarried men. For example,
the instances of conscripted fatherhood, described above,212 all involve men
who never consented (either factually or legally) to the sexual act that
produced their child. Instead, it was the unilateral, wrongful acts of the
mother that caused the pregnancy. Yet in each case, the fathers were
ordered to pay child support—their lack of consent deemed irrelevant. Such
a system continues the stereotype of “male as aggressor/female as victim”
by effectively ignoring those situations where those stereotypical sexual
roles are reversed, treating such situations as, instead, a factual
impossibility.
The sex stereotypes advanced by the thwarted father cases, discussed
above,213 are less obvious but nonetheless still quite damaging to female
interests. Specifically, to allow a pregnant female to universally evade all
notice requirements to a nonmarital father as to the existence of his
biological child likewise paints the unmarried mother as the victim, in need
of sanctuary. And, of course, it may be that she does have such a need, and
it may even be that there are strong justifications for not requiring notice in

205. Id. at 16–17; Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, in
APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND
REPRODUCTION 460, 460 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996) (describing feminists as “the most trenchant
critics of gender-based statutory rape laws”).
206. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
207. COCCA, supra note 76, at 18.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 18, 20.
210. Id. at 22.
211. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law,
85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 32 n.87 (1994).
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. See supra Part III.B.
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some situations; however, the law is currently not that specific. Instead, as
the law exists today, an unmarried female can effectively terminate a
father’s rights by refusing to disclose the existence of the child or her
location regardless of their relationship.214 It is important for feminists to
recognize the harm that is being caused here and realize that this harm goes
directly to the heart of reproductive freedom. Thus, feminists must be
careful of what Professor Halley describes as “representing women as end
points of pain, imagining them as lacking the agency to cause harm to
others and particularly to harm men.”215 After all, in doing so, “feminists
refuse also to see women—even injured ones—as powerful actors.”216
In sum, just as feminists have historically been concerned with how
women can actually be harmed by laws that serve to only protect female
interests, so too should they be concerned about the current failures of the
law to protect the parental rights of unwed fathers. The failure to protect
men’s interest in this regard creates a system of discrimination vis-à-vis
nonmarital males, and this discrimination only underscores many of the
same damaging sex stereotypes from which feminists have fought long and
hard to distance themselves.
4. Creates Negative Consequences for Women
This Article is titled as it is because, under the current law as it relates
to the reproductive rights of nonmarital men, neither gender escapes
unscathed. Instead, these laws both marginalize unwed fathers and
simultaneously demonize unwed mothers—and by extension, all women.
Beyond perpetuating the sex stereotypes discussed above, the laws’ failure
to adequately protect the reproductive rights of unmarried fathers holds two
undesirable consequences for women. First, it paints women in a negative
light and, second, it encourages behavior that most women would find
offensive.
In terms of how these laws portray women, one must keep in mind that
the cases referenced above are relatively high profile cases. They are the
variety of cases that tend to get significant mainstream press and, as a
result, could heavily influence how the average person views unmarried
mothers. And the women in those cases include women who either sexually
assaulted men or lied to men about the existence or location of their
children. Yet, regardless, the women ended up bearing no legal
consequences. On the surface, then, these women appear as liars and
schemers. The men, on the other hand, although innocent of any
214. See supra Part III.B.
215. HALLEY, supra note 24, at 346.
216. Id. (“Feminism objectifies women, feminism erases their agency—could that be right?”).
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wrongdoing, suffered greatly and without any legal remedy at the hands of
these women. To say that such a message does not reflect well on women
would be an understatement; nonetheless, it is precisely the message these
cases send and will continue to send until there is a change in the law.
Additionally, to those men who hear these messages, consider the
behaviors they encourage. Recall that, given that the law currently offers
little protection, men must not only protect themselves, but must do so at
every turn. For unmarried men in intimate relationships who wish to legally
father a resulting child, they must doubt everything their partner tells them
about her fertility; whether she is pregnant; the status of that pregnancy;
and what she intends to do with any resulting child. The decision in
Heidbreder v. Carton explicitly sent that message when it ruled that it was
unreasonable for the father to rely on the mother’s representations that she
would neither put the child up for adoption nor move to Minnesota—both
of which she eventually did.217 In addition, lest the mother get out of his
sight, nonmarital fathers are being sent the message by this line of cases to
keep tabs on where she is at all times. Indeed, in the cases discussed
above,218 the only action that would have helped the men who were trying
desperately to locate their child would have been to constantly stalk the
mother of the child. After all, the putative father registry only works if the
father knows exactly where the mother plans to give the child up for
adoption.219 But, even then, the putative father registry offers limited
protection because, even if a father registered in every such registry in the
country, not all states offer this service, and the mother could have simply
used a different name to evade detection.220 In order to protect their
reproductive freedom, then, men are being encouraged to resort to stalking
and perpetually distrusting the women with whom they are involved—two
behaviors most women, and indeed most human beings, would prefer not to
deal with.
V. REDRAWING THE LINES: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The primary goal of this Article is to advance the proposition that male
reproductive freedom is not only a very serious issue, but also one that—
for the reasons outlined above—should be of concern to feminists. Legal
feminists, drawing upon struggles of the past and lessons learned in the
process, are particularly well-suited to help lead the way in striking a
balance that is more protective of fathers’ rights. How exactly that balance

217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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is to be achieved is, of course, a much tougher question to answer given
that whatever rights are given to men could come at the expense of the
legal protections currently held by women and children. Although a much
more robust discussion is needed to eventually guide the courts as they
attempt to balance these interests, what follows are some avenues through
which a more equitable solution might be attained.
A. Conscripted Fathers
To solve the problem of men being forced into legal fatherhood either
through statutory rape or sexual assault,221 the law needs a mechanism
whereby men can escape liability for child support if the man can
successfully prove that he never consented to the sexual act that resulted in
the child. So far, the law has refused to allow any such exception on the
basis that the child is innocent of any wrongdoing and deserves support
from both parents.222 When it comes to adjudicating child support claims,
however, the child’s best interest in receiving support from both parents
does not always mean the biological father is strictly liable. For example, a
child born as a result of artificial insemination to a single mother would
almost always have no right of support from the biological father.223
Instead, unless the donor explicitly consented to becoming a legal parent,224
the law would only view the child as having one parent—the mother—
despite the fact that it would almost certainly be in the child’s best interest
to receive support from both biological parents.
It is, of course, true that the policies underlying the need for consent in
the artificial insemination context differ somewhat from those involving
men who become fathers as a result of either statutory rape or sexual
assault. The policies behind requiring consent in the case of sperm donors
is to encourage donation and, at the same time, protect donees from future
paternity claims.225 After all, “a popular sperm donor could potentially
221. See supra Part III.A.
222. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
223. See Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between
Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 973 (2009) (“The
approach taken by the UPA and most states is to declare that the sperm donor is not a parent to the
child.”) (footnote omitted).
224. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17–44(b) (West 2013) (“Unless the donor of semen and the
woman have entered into a written contract to the contrary, the donor . . . shall have no rights or duties
stemming from the conception of a child.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23–2208(f) (Supp. 2013) (“The donor
of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination . . . is treated in law as if he
were not the birth father of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the
woman.”).
225. See In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 31 (Colo. 1989) (noting how such laws provide “men
with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to married and unmarried women alike without fear of
liability for child support”).
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father dozens of children.”226 Nonetheless, given the harms that arise from
the present state of the law, a similar exception is likewise necessary to
guard against fatherhood by conscription.
Of course, a consent exception in these cases would need to operate
somewhat differently than it does when talking about artificial
insemination. There is, after all, a real danger of fraud in allowing a
putative father to simply raise lack of consent as a defense to a claim of
child support. Indeed, in an attempt to avoid liability, fathers might be
encouraged to routinely claim that they did not consent to the sexual act
that gave rise to a child and, given the private nature of most sexual
relations, courts would have quite a difficult time ascertaining the merits of
such a defense. As such, for a consent defense to operate effectively in this
factual setting, it would need to be much more narrow. Otherwise, an
overly generous consent defense could permit even meritorious claims for
child support to ultimately fail.
Instead, any such exception would, first, be limited to only those
situations where the man never consented to the sexual act that resulted in
pregnancy. Situations in which he engaged in sexual intercourse under the
belief that the mother could not get pregnant or would not get pregnant due
to birth control would fall outside the consent exception. By limiting the
rule in this way, it would protect only those men who would otherwise be
deprived of their reproductive choice should they be forced to pay child
support for the resulting child. After all, those men who willingly engaged
in sexual intercourse with a woman, despite what they may have been led
to believe about her ability to conceive, were still very much in a position
to protect themselves from becoming fathers. Not only could they have
chosen to use contraception, but they also could have elected to simply
abstain from sexual intercourse. Accordingly, under this proposal, the law
would remain unchanged in those jurisdictions that have held men liable
for child support despite the mother’s misrepresentation that she was on
birth control or was sterile.227
A second way in which to narrow such a defense would be to require
men to prove lack of consent by clear and convincing evidence. The
purpose of this heightened standard would be to further protect against
fraudulent claims and, at the same time, minimize frivolous claims that
would only serve to waste judicial resources. Under the clear and
convincing standard, a party “must convince the trier of fact that it is highly

226. Lewis, supra note 223, at 975.
227. Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father’s Right to Pursue a Claim of
Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2005) (“Child support obligations
attach immediately upon birth, without regard to whether fatherhood was desired or conception
occurred through the mother’s deceit as to her fertility or use of birth control.”).
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probable that the facts he alleges are correct.”228 Family law is, of course,
no stranger to the clear and convincing standard; indeed, there are several
areas of family law in which the threat of fraud is great and, as a result,
courts have employed this heightened standard.229
Applying this heightened standard here, victims of statutory rape would
have little difficulty meeting the required burden. Specifically, they need
only prove that they were below the age of consent at the time the child in
question was conceived. State legislatures set the age of consent at a certain
point for good reasons,230 and those below that age should be protected not
only by criminal laws relating to statutory rape but also those laws relating
to child support. And, given the relative ease with which a person can
prove his age, child support claims involving male statutory rape victims
would be fairly easy to dispose of under the consent defense.
Adult men, on the other hand, who claim the child was a product of
nonconsensual sex or insemination would have to resort to other evidence
to meet this high burden of proof. For this reason, the burden may be quite
difficult to meet in a number of cases. Consider, for example, the case of
S.F., discussed above,231 where the father had evidence that the mother had
told acquaintances that she had sexually assaulted S.F. while he was
sleeping. It could be that a court would find that the mother’s admission of
sexual assault was sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the father did not consent. However, in cases where a mother denies any
claims of sexual assault or nonconsensual self-insemination, the father
228. Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a
Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Notice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 462 (2002).
229. For example, courts in those states that recognize common law marriage have noted that
such claims are a “fruitful source of perjury and fraud,” Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d
1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998), and, as such have placed a heavy burden on the party claiming common
marriage. See, e.g., Ashley Hedgecock, Comment, Untying the Knot: The Propriety of South Carolina’s
Recognition of Common Law Marriage, 58 S.C. L. REV. 555, 565 (2007) (“In reality, the high burden of
proof imposed on a claimant alleging common law marriage successfully sorted fraudulent claims from
legitimate ones.”). Similarly, in cases in which a person challenges the validity of a former spouse’s
subsequent remarriage, the courts, recognizing the possibility for fraud, require the complaining spouse
to produce evidence that is “clear, strong, and satisfactory and so persuasive as to leave no room for
reasonable doubt.” Chandler v. Cent. Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 652 (Kan. 1993). Called the “last-in-time
marriage presumption,” this doctrine applies in cases where a former spouse claims some kind of
spousal benefits on the basis that, even though the other spouse remarried, there was no evidence of
divorce from the former spouse. See Peter Nash Swisher & Melanie Diana Jones, The Last-in-Time
Marriage Presumption, 29 FAM. L.Q. 409, 409 (1995).
Of course, a court might be skeptical of such evidence given the danger of collusion. Specifically, a
mother and father could agree to both claim sexual assault on the part of the mother whereby the child
would continue to collect welfare benefits and yet the father need not reimburse the state. Admittedly,
the threat of collusion poses a difficult issue relating to proof. Hopefully, however, the threat of being
charged with sexual assault would discourage most mothers from going along with such a scheme.
Further, the father should be dissuaded from bringing such a claim given that, as discussed more fully
below, should the consent defense succeed, he would lose all parental rights vis-à-vis the child.
230. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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would have a much harder time satisfying his burden. Given that most acts
of sexual intercourse, sexual assault and, presumably, self-insemination do
not take place in public, absent some kind of admission from the mother, it
would be almost impossible for courts to decide whether a child was
conceived without the biological father’s consent. Nonetheless, the failure
of the consent defense to cover those more questionable cases may send a
message to potential fathers to not willingly put themselves in positions of
vulnerability—such as passing out drunk in a woman’s home or trusting
relative strangers to dispose of one’s semen.232
B. Thwarted Fathers
Solving the problem of thwarted fathers is much more difficult because
there are many more interests that must be balanced. Given that these cases
typically arise when the biological mother attempts to put the child up for
adoption, the biological father’s rights must be balanced not only with
those of the adoptive parents, but also the state’s interest in promoting
adoptions. After all, if a biological father could appear at any time to claim
his child, adoption would become a much more uncertain and, thus, less
attractive option for those couples seeking children. Also, to rip a child
away from an adoptive home could be devastating not only to the adoptive
parents, but the child itself who could have already formed strong
attachments to that family.233 Finally, the mother’s privacy interests are
also very much at play in these situations—as noted earlier, she may have
compelling reasons for not contacting or even identifying the father to
inform him of the adoption.234
In an attempt to balance these competing concerns, the putative father
registry has emerged as the dominant solution.235 And, at first blush, it
appears to be a rather clever solution whereby the onus is on the father to
protect himself by simply registering in a timely manner. As discussed
above, however, these systems often fail to adequately protect the rights of
nonmarital fathers. Few men are even aware of such registries and, given
that the registries are state specific, men are placed in the sometimes
impossible situation of having to figure out exactly where the mother
intends to give the child up for adoption.236 Failure to register in the proper

232. See supra Part III.A.2.
233. To understand just how horrific such scenarios can be, one need only recall the cases
revolving around Baby Jessica and Baby Richard. See generally Gregory A. Kelson, In the Best Interest
of the Child: What Have We Learned from Baby Jessica and Baby Richard?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
353 (2000).
234. See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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state leads to an irretrievable loss of parental rights—an aspect of the law
that, as discussed above,237 some mothers have used to effectively hide
adoptions from biological fathers so as to permanently deprive them of
parental rights.
It is the opinion of this Article that the putative father registry does
nonetheless provide a good start to protecting the rights of nonmarital
fathers. The alternative approach, providing constructive notice by
publication, is much less effective.238 As the Supreme Court has noted,
notice through publication is rarely effective: “Chance alone brings to the
attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in
the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area
of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will
never reach him are large indeed.”239 However, some adjustments to the
putative father registry are needed. What follows are a number of
suggestions as to aspects of the putative father registry that might be
broadened or either changed so as to provide better protections for
nonmarital fathers.
1. Require Greater Disclosures from the Mother
The law’s current refusal to require the mother to identify the father is
not only required to protect the mother’s privacy interests, but is also
necessary to protect her emotional and physical health.240 After all, the
father of her child could also be her rapist, her abuser, her relative (i.e.,
incest) or someone whose presence in her life simply does more harm than
good. Being forced to identify such men, who would then be notified, could
be very traumatic for any number of reasons. Nonetheless, absent some
disclosures by the mother, the current state of the law makes it extremely
difficult for that male to safeguard his ability to come forward and father
the resulting child.
One potential compromise might lie in what exactly a mother is
required to disclose. Instead of requiring disclosure relating to the father’s
identity, perhaps states could require disclosures that help uncover the
mother’s location for purposes of maximizing the father’s ability to
effectively protect his rights. For instance, a state could require that a
mother who wishes to put her child up for adoption disclose and document
her previous residences as far back as one year before the child was born.
Doing so would offer a number of benefits. First, the law would continue to

237.
238.
239.
240.

See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra note 142.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
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safeguard the mother’s right to refuse to identify the father. And, that
which she is required to disclose is less likely to result in the harms
discussed earlier. Additionally, by requiring the mother to indicate past
states in which she has resided, the law would make it less likely that a
mother can thwart the desires of a biological father who genuinely wants to
father the resulting child.241
Finally, the burden remains on the father to protect his rights. If his
desire to father the child is genuine, he needs to demonstrate that
willingness by promptly registering in the appropriate state. If he fails to
register, he would still lose his rights. Nonetheless, in a statutory scheme
like the one proposed here, registration is more likely to result in a diligent
biological father actually receiving notice of an adoption than in a statutory
scheme—like those discussed above—where the state was unwilling to
look beyond its own registry.242 And, as the courts have consistently held, it
is not the mother’s duty to inform him of her pregnancy given that,
whenever a male engages in sexual intercourse with a female, he should be
on notice that a child could result.243
2. A National Registry
A number of scholars and commentators have suggested that, instead
of having state specific putative father registries, the law should instead
move to a national registry.244 Implementation of such a program would
eliminate the need for men to effectively stalk the mothers of their children
so as to keep tabs on her every move. Instead, states would require that
before any adoption can be finalized, a search of the national registry must
first be conducted and any man who has registered as the potential father of
that mother’s child be contacted. Doing so would not only enhance the
protections of nonmarital fathers by making it more likely that they would
receive notice of pending adoptions, but nonmarital mothers as well. As
one commentator explains:
241. Incidentally, such disclosures would only need to encompass past domiciles, excluding those
states the mother might have merely temporarily visited. Given that the goal is to better match up which
states’ putative father registries are searched with the biological father’s expectations of which states
the mother would likely surrender the child, requiring the mother to disclose states in which she has
resided should be sufficient. After all, had the biological father met the mother when she was merely
visiting a state, he would have little reason to believe that she would return simply to give the child up
for adoption. He would instead likely assume that she would do so in the state in which she permanently
resides.
242. See supra Part III.B.3.
243. See Helms & Spence, supra note 135, at 20 (discussing statutes that view nonmarital sex as
sufficient to put a man on notice of a possible pregnancy).
244. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 134; Helms & Spence, supra note 135, at 16, 40;; Donna L.
Moore, Comment, Implementing a National Putative Father Registry by Utilizing Existing
Federal/State Collaborative Databases, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1033, 1051 (2003).
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A national putative father registry advances the privacy and safety
interests of mothers as well as assisting their adoption decision by
clarifying the intentions and rights of birth fathers. The erection of
a national registry provides States with the ability to relieve women
of naming unwed fathers of their children. This protects the privacy
right of a woman not to name the man or men with whom she has
had sexual intercourse and relieves the woman of the need to
accurately identify the father when she may or may not know his
identity. Importantly, protecting mothers’ privacy rights also
protects their safety from abusive men with whom they have
fathered a child, because the registry does not need to disclose the
mother’s address or location. For example, a woman may conceive
her child in Alabama, deliver and relinquish her child for adoption
in Kansas, and ultimately decide to settle in Missouri. The registry
only needs to provide information about the adoption proceeding in
Kansas, so the woman’s actual location is concealed.245
The question arises, of course, as to who would create and maintain
this national registry. Some have suggested that Congress is the appropriate
body given that it could justify doing so under the Commerce Clause and
then require state participation under the Spending Clause.246 Regardless of
how such a system might be implemented, the purpose here is to merely
echo and endorse the suggestion of a national putative father registry as one
means of addressing the discrimination currently faced by nonmarital
fathers.
3. Increase the Effectiveness of Existing Putative Father Registries
Assuming the law is not yet comfortable in moving in the directions
discussed thus far in this section, one interim remedy would be to simply
modify existing state laws as they relate to putative father registries so as to
provide a greater chance that nonmarital fathers actually learn of their
existence. The two primary ways this might be accomplished is, first,
through greater promotion of the putative father registry and, second,
extending the period of time within which the father can register and still
be protected.
The first is relatively simple and uncontroversial. Quite simply, states
need to do more to inform fathers of the putative father registry and the
benefits it provides. Many states have statutes that require regular notice of

245. Beck, supra note 134, at 1072.
246. Id. at 1073–74.
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the registries appear in print locations.247 Nonetheless, such efforts are
likely insufficient to provide any meaningful notice. To better
communicate this message, states need to take steps to publicize the
registries in channels with which those men in need of this protection—
including the young and the uneducated—are likely to come into contact.
As one commentator suggests, “publication of the registry’s existence by
means of television advertisements or through the dissemination of
information by high school guidance counselors and sex education
programs would increase the likelihood that putative fathers have the
requisite knowledge to protect their rights to their offspring.”248
The second suggestion is a bit more controversial, but could likewise
offer some greater protections to nonmarital fathers. Although some
variation exists, most states require a biological father to register within 30
days of the child’s birth;249 otherwise, he forfeits his right to notification of
any subsequent adoption proceedings. One way states might attempt to
ameliorate the harsh effects of the current system is by extending that time
period. Doing so would provide those fathers who are attempting to locate
their biological child with more time to do so. Of course, the more time a

247. Consider for example, MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-214 (2013):
Duties of department.
(1) The department shall:
(a) prescribe a registration form for the information that a putative father submits under 422-205; and
(b) make the registration forms available through:
(i) the department;
(ii) each clerk of a district court; and
(iii) each local health department.
(2) A notice provided by the department that informs the public about the purpose and
operation of the registry must be posted in a conspicuous place by each:
(a) clerk of a district court;
(b) driver’s examination station of the motor vehicle division of the department of justice;
(c) local health department; and
(d) county clerk and recorder.
(3) The notice under subsection (2) must include information regarding:
(a) where to obtain a registration form;
(b) where to register;
(c) the circumstances under which a putative father is required to register;
(d) the period under 42–2–206 during which a putative father is required to register in order
to entitle the putative father to receive notice of an adoption;
(e) the information that must be provided for the registry and what other actions the putative
father is required to take to preserve a right to notice;
(f) the consequences of not submitting a timely registration; and
(g) the penalties for filing a false claim with the putative father registry.
248. Thompson, supra note 145, at 1507.
249. Rebeca Aizpuru, Note, Protecting the Unwed Father’s Opportunity to Parent: A Survey of
Paternity Registry Statutes, 18 REV. LITIG. 703, 716 (1999) (“The time limits vary widely by state, but
thirty days after the birth is by far the most common deadline.”).
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father has to appear and potentially halt the adoption, the less desirable that
child might appear to adoptive parents. Thus, although such a move might
do more to protect fathers, increasing the time could also be harmful to
both the child and the state’s interest in promoting adoption. For those
reasons, the solutions offered earlier, albeit more complicated, might be
more mutually beneficial in the long-term.
In sum, for both classes of nonmarital fathers whose reproductive
freedom the law currently fails to adequately safeguard, a number of
possible solutions exist—solutions that would not only continue to
safeguard rights women have achieved as to their own reproductive
freedom, but solutions that would benefit legal feminism in general by
helping ameliorate the harsh concerns outlined above.
CONCLUSION
The fathers’ rights movement is one that has justifiably been looked
upon with suspicion given its past attempts, as one scholar put it, “to co-opt
and adapt feminist rhetoric of equality, victimization, and freedom of
choice, and combine it with taken-for-granted stereotypes of women to turn
the successes of the women’s movement into defeat for mothers.”250 For
that reason, skepticism may be warranted; turning a blind eye to all claims
of gender discrimination by men, however, is not. Reproductive freedom
need not be seen as a zero-sum game, with a victory for one gender
necessarily coming at the expense of the other. In fact, among the many
things feminism has taught us is that laws favoring only women are often
little more than Trojan horses filled with pernicious gender stereotypes.
Thus, the fight for true gender equality has sometimes required feminists to
attack those laws that, on their face, disproportionately favor females.251
The law of statutory rape, discussed above, is but one example.252 The
reproductive rights of nonmarital males should be another.
By failing to include greater protections for nonmarital males in its
fight for legal equality, feminists risk the erosion of several key ideals of
modern legal feminism and, in addition, the creation of new barriers
flowing from the negative messages these cases send about women.253 And,
given the number of avenues through which the law can provide nonmarital
men greater reproductive freedom without causing corresponding harms to
women, there is little to lose but much to gain.254 Finally, given all that
250. Michele A. Adams, Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental Alienation
Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Fathers’ Rights, 40 FAM. L.Q. 315, 323–24 (2006).
251. See supra notes 197–206 and accompanying text.
252. See supra Part III.A.1.
253. See supra Part IV.
254. See supra Part V.
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feminism has taught us about the nature of discrimination and what it
means to truly enjoy equality, feminists are likely the best suited for the job
of addressing the inequality that currently affects the reproductive freedom
of nonmarital men. After all, in the words of Nelson Mandela, “For to be
free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects
and enhances the freedom of others.”255

255. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON
MANDELA 544 (1995).

